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Participating Equally: Using Tax Policy to Improve
Female Workforce and Management Participation
in the 21st Century
Katherine E. Smalley*
Seeking out a more balanced life is not a women’s issue;
balance would be better for us all.1

I. INTRODUCTION
When Nikki Waller and Joann S. Lublin presented the question “why
aren’t there more women in the upper ranks of corporate America?” in their
September 2015 Wall Street Journal article,2 the question appeared almost
cliché. With the recent revitalization, and arguable re-branding of modern
feminism, the debate regarding female representation in the upper echelons
of government and business continues to gain greater attention.3 While
women have made great strides toward equality, they remain noticeably
absent from top leadership positions,4 prompting many to seek ways to
*Associate in the Nashville, Tennessee office of Bass. Berry & Sims PLC. B.S. 2013,
Centre College 2013; J.D. 2016, The University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Can’t Still Have It All, THE ATLANTIC,
July/August 2012, at 100.
2. Nikki Waller & Joann S. Lublin, What’s Holding Women Back in the Workplace?,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2015, at R1.
3. Id. (arguing one of the most vocal supporters of female leadership development is
Facebook COO and Leanin.org founder, Sheryl Sandberg). See also SHERYL SANDBERG,
LEAN IN (1st ed. 2013) (a book that seeks to identify barriers to female top leadership, and
present possible solutions to overcome those barriers). See also About Lean In, LEANIN.ORG,
http://leanin.org/about, (outlining Sandberg’s nonprofit “offering women the ongoing
inspiration and support to help them achieve their goals. If we talk openly about the
challenges women face and work together, we can change the trajectory of women and create
a better world for everyone”).
4. DEBORAH RHODE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP, 1 (2017) (“Despite a half century of equal
opportunity legislation, women’s leadership opportunities are far from equal. The most
comprehensive survey finds that women occupy less than a fifth of senior leadership positions
across the public and private sectors.”) (citing Colorado Women’s College, Benchmarking
Women’s Leadership in the United States (Denver: Colorado Women’s College, 2013)). See
also Catalyst, Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies, CATALYST (last updated Aug. 22,
2017), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-sp-500-companies (showing only 4.4% of
S&P 500 are female). See also Center for American Women in Politics, Women in Elective
Office 2015, CENTER FOR AMERICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS, EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS,
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promote and develop female leadership.
But why should we, as a society, care about female leadership? Far from
merely benefitting one particular portion of society, enhancing and
improving female representation in leadership positions can be beneficial for
society as a whole.5 Although many focus on enhancing the welfare of those
in the lower and middle classes, attention must also be paid to those residing
in the top of the socioeconomic scale, for “it would be a grave mistake, from
a behavioral perspective, to ignore the upper classes.”6
Once we have determined the general utility of improving top female
earners’ wellbeing, the question becomes: how do we improve top
management representation? While ignoring the need for essential changes
in societal views on female leadership would be illogical, there is more that
can be done to improve the pathway toward female management than merely
relying on developing socio-normative views. Thoughtful policy can
provide significant momentum in the movement toward equal management
representation.7
Enter the Internal Revenue Code.8 The Tax Code is a powerful tool that
can be used to promote social objectives.9 This paper seeks to demonstrate
ways in which the Tax Code has previously influenced behavior,10 and to
provide a possible way to use the Tax Code that would positively impact top
female workforce representation.
This article is set forth in three subsequent sections. Section II proceeds
by discussing the gendered nature of tax policy through joint filing for
married couples and the current child and dependent care credit structure.
This section also identifies how this gendered structure provides significant
disincentives to those women seeking top positions.11 Section III then
presents what I have deemed the Equal Participation Model, with equal
monetary and nonmonetary contributions among men and women in families
and in various sectors of the workforce.12 This model would positively
impact not merely top-earning women, but society as a whole.13 Finally,
Section IV presents a possible way to use the Tax Code to work toward the
Equal Participation Model through both individual and employer

RUTGERS UNIV., http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-elective-office-2015 (last visited Nov.
14, 2015) (women hold approximately 20% of U.S. Congressional seats and approximately
25% of state level elective offices).
5. See infra section III and accompanying footnotes.
6. Edward McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1028 (1993).
7. See infra section IV.A and accompanying footnotes.
8. Hereinafter the “Tax Code.”
9. See infra section II, IV.A, and accompanying footnotes.
10. See infra section II and accompanying footnotes.
11. Id.
12. See infra section III and accompanying footnotes.
13. Id.
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incentives.14 While this paper does not provide all of the solutions to the
many challenges facing women who seek top positions, it does seek to
contribute to the ongoing conversation concerning female leadership.

II. CURRENT GENDER IMPLICATIONS IN THE TAX CODE
FOR HIGH ACHIEVING WOMEN
The Tax Code has become a source of political, economic, and social
debate, frequently suffering criticism for its treatment of certain vulnerable
groups.15 The Tax Code’s treatment of women’s issues is no exception to
this critique, as its impact on women has been evaluated since as early as
1939.16 While the Tax Code has since adjusted its treatment of certain
women’s issues,17 the current system remains a source of gender inequity
based upon two particular elements of the Tax Code: joint filing and the
Child and Dependent Care Credit.18
In addition to analyzing the Tax Code’s treatment of women as a whole,
it can also be enlightening to assess its impact upon particular segments of
the female population to perhaps uncover further economic and social
effects.19 In his article “Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code,”20 Edward McCaffery identifies
specific provisions, as well as other federal income taxation principles, and
analyzes their effects upon three distinct sectors of the female population:

14. See infra section IV and accompanying footnotes.
15. See, e.g., TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996)
(anthology of critical tax theory articles spanning subjects including racial segregation,
income inequality treatment, and gender implications under the Tax Code); Nancy J. Knauer,
Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform?, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 210 (2014) (“By
viewing taxpayers only in terms of income level, tax policy is free to consider distributional
issues without having to account for countervailing concerns such as gender or race equity.”).
See generally Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on JudeoChristian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671 (2006); Stacey Y. Abrams, Income, Deductions and
Wealth: A Survey of Policy Remedies to the Intersection of Color, Gender and Taxation, 28
S.U. L. REV. 255 (2001).
16. See generally Smith v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939) aff’d, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1940); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work:
Aid for Affluent Husband Care, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109 (2011); McCaffery, supra
note 6; Allan J. Samansky, Child Care Expenses and the Income Tax, 50 FLA. L. REV. 245,
259–69 (1998); Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of EmploymentRelated Child-Care Expenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 386 (1998); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male
Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987).
17. For example, the adoption of the childcare deduction and the evolution to the current
Child and Dependent Care Deduction came as a response to the initial policies allowing
absolutely no deductions or credits for childcare expenses arising out of full time employment
of two spouses. See infra section II.B and accompanying footnotes.
18. See infra sections II.A, II.B and accompanying footnotes.
19. See infra sections II.A, II.B, II.C and accompanying footnotes.
20. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993).
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the “uppers,” the “middles,” and the “lowers.”21 McCaffery concludes that
those women falling in the “lowers” and “uppers” categories are
significantly more affected by the current federal income tax regime than
those in the “middle” class.22 While national social and economic situations
have changed since 1993,23 the reality of severe Tax Code based
disincentives for high earning women remain.24 In fact, some critics have
described the current systems of joint filing and childcare expense as “aid
for affluent husband care.”25 By recognizing the inherent gender biases and
resulting disincentives for female workforce participation, particularly
among those women in potential top-earning positions, we can identify ways
to reduce, if not eliminate, these impediments to the benefit of all.26
A. JOINT FILING
The joint filing system was implemented to address the disparity
between community property and non-community property states
concerning single income couples’ ability to decrease their tax liability by
offsetting a portion of the single earner’s wages as income of the nonearning
spouse.27 However, since its establishment in its current form in 1948,28 the
joint filing structure has developed into a marriage penalty for dual income
21. McCaffery, supra note 20, at 1014.
22. Id. at 1014–15, 1020, 1028–29.
23. For example, the most recent economic recession severely impacted employment
throughout the United States and other members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), driving many women to both enter into and remain
engaged in the workforce. See KATRIN ELBORGH-WOYTEK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, WOMEN, WORK, AND THE ECONOMY: MACROECONOMIC GAINS FROM
GENDER EQUITY, 12 (2013).
24. The Joint Filing and Child and Dependent Care Credit system has virtually gone
unchanged, in terms of substantive elements, since 1993. Compare I.R.C. § 21 (1988) to
I.R.C. § 21. Compare § 1 (1990) to I.R.C. § 1 (2014).
25. Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: Aid for Affluent Husband Care, 21
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109, 111 (2011). See also Brigid Schulte, Unlike in the 1950s, there
is no ‘typical’ U.S. family today, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/local/wp/2014/09/04/for-the-first-time-since-the-1950s-there-is-no-typical-u-s-fa
mily/ (“And yet, despite the diversity now of U.S. families, most of the laws and policies that
affect families’ work and life have not changed. U.S. tax policy, the Social Security system,
laws governing work hours, all still favor married breadwinner-homemaker families.”).
26. See infra sections III, IV, and accompanying footnotes.
27. “Adoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce substantial geographical
equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes. The impetuous enactment of
community-property legislation by States that have long used the common law will be
forestalled. The incentive for married couples in common-law States to attempt the reduction
of their taxes by the division of their income through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies,
and family partnerships will be reduced materially. Administrative difficulties stemming
from the use of such devices will be diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous
legislation on the income tax treatment of trusts and family partnerships. In effect, these
amendments represent the adoption of a new national system for ascertaining Federal income
tax liability. The adoption of these amendments will extend substantial benefits to residents
of both community-property and common-law States.” Revenue Act of 1948, 1948-1 C.B.
285 (I.R.S. 1948).
28. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110.
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couples and a marriage bonus for single income households.29 In his article
Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal,30 Yair Listokin describes the
theoretical underpinnings of the current joint filing structure.31 Under this
system, the Tax Code favors couples equity32 and the progressive marginal
rate, often to the detriment of marriage neutrality.33
While single income couples enjoy the benefits of wider tax brackets and
ultimately a lower marginal rate under the current joint filing structure,34 the
current joint filing system for married couples provides a disincentive for the
secondary earner35 to continue working.36 For potential dual income
households, the first dollar of the secondary earner’s income will be taxed at

29. In her article, Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution, Lora Cicconi
elaborates upon the marriage penalty and bonus structure in the Tax Code:
Because tax rates are progressive, meaning that marginal rates increase as
income increases, this system benefits couples with disparate incomes by
allowing them to shift some of the income of the higher earning spouse into a
lower tax bracket.52 In contrast, it adversely affects those with equal incomes
because neither the joint filing brackets nor exemption levels are twice as large
as under the single filing system; the system pushes part of the income of equal
earning spouses into a higher marginal tax bracket than the bracket applied to
single filers. This result is the oft-discussed “marriage penalty.”
Lora Cicconi, Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution: An Examination of
Gender-Based Tax Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42 GONZ. L. REV.
257, 266 (2007); McCaffery, supra note 6, at 991 (“Whether or not there is an actual ‘marriage
penalty’ under the general rate structure depends on the relative allocation of earnings
between spouses: those who already have a 50-50 division receive no benefit from the deemed
income splitting, and purely pay the price of the higher rates; for those who have a 100-0 split,
the benefits of the split income predominate over the burden of the higher rates. The marriage
penalty is thus relative.”).
30. Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185 (2014).
31. Id. at 185-95. Listokin identifies three theoretical foundations for taxation, namely
couples equity, marriage neutrality, and progressive marginal rate taxation, and then explains
how the current joint filing structure adheres to two of these theories: progressive marginal
rate taxation and couples equity.
32. “Couples equity” is the theory that couples earning equivalent gross income as a couple
should be taxed equally. Id. at 187.
33. Id. at 188. Listokin defines marriage neutrality as the idea that two individuals should
be taxed the same regardless their marital status. Id. at 187. Listokin further proposes that
couples equity and marriage neutrality are of equivalent importance in a modern Tax Code,
thus both principles must “share the burden” under the most efficient and effective system.
Id. at 194. As Listokin identifies in his article, “high rates on secondary earners are likely
inefficient, as secondary earners’ labor decisions are much more sensitive to taxes than
primary earners’ labor decisions.” Id. at 189.
34. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 991.
35. In this paper, secondary earner is defined as the spouse whose first dollar of income
will be taxed at a higher initial marginal rate based upon the greater income of the primary
earner. Described another way, the primary earner is the spouse who earns more income.
While it is not always the case that the primary earner will be the husband and the secondary
earner will be the wife, this is likely going to be the scenario, particularly once the couple has
children. McCafferey, supra note 6, at 993.
36. Cicconi, supra note 29, at 266 (2007) (“The joint filing system, in combination with
the progressive rate structure, creates disincentives for secondary earners to enter the labor
force.”).
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a greater marginal rate than if the two earners filed separate returns.37
Therefore, comparatively the secondary earner will have significantly fewer
after-tax dollars than the primary earner, resulting in a “marriage penalty”
for dual income couples with relatively equivalent incomes.
This disparity in after-tax income is made even more pronounced among
top-earning couples.38 For couples earning fewer total dollars, the secondary
earner’s base marginal rate is not that much different from that of the primary
earner. However, the higher the primary earner’s marginal bracket, the
higher the base bracket for the secondary earner.39 For couples with at least
one earner in the top marginal rate, the secondary earner’s first income dollar
will be taxed at 39.6%.40 Thus joint filing provides a particularly significant
disincentive for secondary earner workforce participation among couples in
top-earning brackets.
The dual income marriage penalty, together with the fact that the vast
majority of secondary earners are women, only serves to reinforce gender
stereotypes in workforce participation.41 When their labor is taxed at a
higher rate, secondary earners subtly are informed that their workforce
participation is less valuable, and thus less desirable for society as a whole,
encouraging these secondary earners to opt out of the labor market.42
B. THE CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE CREDIT
In addition to the marriage penalty under the joint filing structure, dual
income couples face social and financial complications when it comes to
child care. While social stigma surrounding the “working mother” has
continued to dissolve, the Tax Code continues to reflect antiquated notions
of gendered labor.43
37. Cicconi, supra note 29, at 267 (“When the secondary earner is faced with her labor
force decision, her first dollar of income is subject to the same marginal tax rate as the primary
earner’s last dollar of income—the exemption and lower tax rates that apply at the lower
income levels no longer apply because they have already benefited the primary earner.”).
38. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1025–29 (discussing disincentives among top-earning
couples for secondary earner workforce participation); Cicconi, supra note 29, at 267 (“Even
part-time work at low wage rates may be taxed at up to 35% under the current tax system if
the primary earner places the couple in the highest tax bracket, and once social security and
payroll taxes are included, that number can easily increase to over 50%.”); Margaret Ryznar,
To Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 921, 939 (2009) (“Professional couples who are married also
disproportionately suffer a higher tax bill—in such cases, one spouse must also pay the
couple’s top marginal rate on most, if not all, of her income.”).
39. Compare couples in which the primary earner receives $20,000 to one in which that
earner receives $100,000. In the $20,000 example, the top marginal rate for primary earner
will be 15%, causing the secondary earner’s “base marginal rate” to be 15%. For the couple
in which the primary earner receives $100,000, the secondary earner’s “base marginal rate”
will be 25% because that is the primary earner’s marginal rate. See I.R.C. § 1(a).
40. See I.R.C. § 1(a).
41. Listokin, supra note 30, at 189.
42. Id.
43. “A couple fitting the stereotypical pattern in which the husband works and the wife
does not will have a minimal marriage penalty, or even a marriage benefit, if the spouses file
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The current Dependent Care Credit is the result of a decades-long
evolution in female workforce participation and debate.44 First rising to
national attention with the case Smith v. Commissioner,45 the proper
treatment of child-care expenses for dual income couples has become a
consistent source of debate and scholarship.46 In Smith, the Board of Tax
Appeals held, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that expenses for child-care,
while a necessary expense of Mrs. Smith’s income production, were not
eligible for inclusion with the general business expense deduction because
such expenses were primarily personal.47 Although the Smith opinion is no
longer held in great esteem due to its blatant sexism and the growing
prevalence of female workforce participation, this holding laid the
foundation for the tax treatment of child-care expenses.48
Although Congress enacted a limited deduction in 1954 for those childcare expenses incurred for employment purposes,49 the Tax Reform Act of
197650 and its subsequent revisions currently give a limited credit for childcare expenses.51 The current Dependent Care Credit contains several
similarities to the former deduction, including an “employment related
expense” requirement for credit eligibility,52 echoing the general
jointly. However, the more the couple strays from this traditional living pattern, that is, the
more equivalent the spouses’ incomes, the more severe their marriage penalty.” Amy C.
Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature
of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 303 (1997).
44. See infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
45. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939) aff’d, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
46. See generally Cicconi, supra note 29; Fellows, supra note 16; McCaffery, supra note
6; McCluskey, supra note 16; Samansky, supra note 16.
47. Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039 (“We are not prepared to say that the care of children, like
similar aspects of family and household life, is other than a personal concern.”).
48. Samansky, supra note 16, at 259–69 (1998). See also Fellows, supra note 16, at 386
(1998) (“By treating child-care expenditures as personal, the tax law perpetuates the economic
exploitation, sexism, and racism that is rationalized by distinguishing between public
production and private reproduction.”).
49. Samansky, supra note 16, at 260. The 1954 childcare deduction was limited to women
and widowers, and included a relatively strict phase out for dual income couples. I.R.C. §
214(a), (b)(2) (1954). This structure reflected the Congressional bifurcation of childcare
expenses incurred out of necessity, which were treated as a business expense, and those
incurred out of choice, which were treated as a personal expense. Samansky, supra note 16,
at 260–61. This deduction was revised in 1971 to extend greater benefits to more taxpayers;
yet the rationale for any deduction was limited by some element of necessity and phased out
above a certain income level. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 210, 85 Stat. 497,
518 (incorporated in I.R.C. § 214 (1971)); see 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1965–70 (discussing
Congress’s reasons for the 1971 revisions of § 214).
50. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (incorporated in
I.R.C. §44A (1976)).
51. I.R.C. § 21. Section 21 states, “In the case of an individual for which there are 1 or
more qualifying individuals (as defined in subsection (b)(1)) with respect to such individual,
there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year
an amount equal to the applicable percentage of the employment-related expenses (as defined
in subsection (b)(2)) paid by such individual during the taxable year.” Id. at § 21(a)(1) (2017).
52. I.R.C. § 21(b)(2) (2017). The language in current Section 21, “amounts paid for the
following expenses, but only if such expenses are incurred to enable the taxpayer to be
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Congressional expectations that any tax benefits resulting from child-care
expenses must be necessary to the taxpayer’s employment.53 Second, there
is a specific dollar limit on the deduction or credit available to taxpayers
under these structures.54 Additionally, the § 21 Dependent Care Credit phase
down reflects the former § 214 phase out at certain income benchmarks.55
Furthermore, those couples seeking to take advantage of these tax benefits
must file jointly under both the former deduction framework and current
credit.56
Although the current Dependent Care Credit retained several elements
of the pre-1976 deductions, the current credit structure reflects the
Congressional desire to benefit low and middle-income households.57 Some
scholars have even gone so far as to argue that the current Dependent Care
Credit aims primarily at wealth redistribution,58 and reflects a certain level
of progressivity.59 Although credits generally are structured to benefit
equally all taxpayers with the same reduction in tax liability regardless of
marginal rate, the Dependent Care Credit under Section 21 phases down
among higher-earning individuals.60 Under this system, two secondary
earners who must pay the same amount of after-tax dollars for dependent
care will be treated differently by the sheer fact that one has a higher adjusted
gross income.61 Therefore, the Dependent Care Credit provides an additional
gainfully employed,” almost directly mirrors the language in former Section 214, “but only if
such care is for the purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.” I.R.C. § 21
(b)(2)(A); I.R.C. § 214(a) (1954).
53. The text of § 21 includes the qualification that deductions are allowed for child or
dependent care expenses “only if such expenses are incurred to enable the taxpayer to be
gainfully employed.” I.R.C. § 21 (b)(2). Note that even the title of § 21 qualifies deductions
for expenses “necessary for gainful employment.” I.R.C. § 21(emphasis added). See also
Samansky, supra note 16, at 260-61.
54. I.R.C. § 21(c); I.R.C. § 214(c) (1971).
55. I.R.C. § 21(a) (reducing the allowable credit by “1 percentage point for each $2,000
(or fraction thereof) by which the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income for the taxable year
exceeds $15,000” but not below twenty (20) percent); I.R.C. § 214(d) (1975) (beginning the
deduction phase out at $35,000 with no deduction allowed for taxpayers with income in excess
of $44,600). Note that legislation has been proposed in the House of Representatives that
would increase the amount deductible to a 50% cap and likewise increase the phase down
percentage to 35% of the eligible expenses incurred. H.R. 2703, 114th Cong. (2015).
56. I.R.C. § 21(e)(2); I.R.C. § 214 (e)(1) (1971).
57. “While deductions favor taxpayers in the higher marginal tax brackets, a tax credit
provides more help for taxpayers in the lower brackets.” S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. 1, at 132
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3565.
58. “By circumventing the progressive rate structure to allow for greater reductions in tax
liability for lower-income taxpayers than for higher-income taxpayers, the credit appears
more related to redistribution of wealth concerns than determining the appropriate tax base
under an ideal accretion tax.” Fellows, supra note 16, at 386.
59. Amy Dunbar and Susan Nordhauser, Is the Child Care Credit Progressive?, 44 NAT’L
TAX J. 519 (1991) (presenting their study considering the credit structure and concluding that
the credit is progressive).
60. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2).
61. Consider two secondary earners who, for simplicity, must each pay $1,000 in childcare
expenses in a particular year. The low-income taxpayer will be able to take a $350 credit,
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disincentive for workforce participation among top-income secondary
earners.62
C. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGH ACHIEVING WOMEN
The current joint filing system and Dependent Care Credit are two
distinct elements of the Tax Code that impact those secondary earners in the
top marginal tax brackets.63 First, secondary earners in top-income couples
will feel the sting of the “marriage penalty” more severely than their lower
earning counterparts.64 The entirety of their income will be taxed at a much
higher base marginal rate, resulting in less after-tax income.65 Second, the
Dependent Care Credit is designed to benefit lower and middle income
households, and the current phase down results in fewer effective benefits
for those top earners.66
In addition to joint filing and dependent care credit disincentives among
top-earning couples, secondary earners face additional unique barriers to
workforce participation. The first barrier is the lack of necessity; while
necessity frequently is the deciding factor that keeps secondary earners
working in lower earning couples,67 this necessity is not a factor driving
higher-income secondary earners to workforce participation. The second
barrier is the unattractiveness of part time options for top secondary earners
because of the few after-tax dollars as a result of high base marginal rates on
secondary-earner income.68 Despite the fact that a notably high percentage
of top earners operate in dual income households, the disincentive for parttime workforce participation has the potential to push secondary earners in
top-earning couples to opt out of workforce participation as opposed to
whereas a top earner may only claim a $200 credit. See id.
62. The Obama White House published a Fact Sheet setting forth the President’s tax reform
proposals. See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: A Simpler, Fairer Tax Code That
Responsibly Invests in Middle Class Families, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/17/fact-sheet-simpler-fairer-tax-coderesponsibly-invests-middle-class-fami. As the title of the publication notes, these reforms are
focused on the improving the welfare of middle class families by increasing the maximum
credit allowed. (“The President’s [Obama’s] tax proposal would streamline child care tax
benefits and triple the maximum child care credit for middle class families with young
children, increasing it to $3,000 per child.”). Even if these proposals were adopted, topincome secondary earners would not benefit from these reforms because their income would
exceed the maximum income under which the credit may apply.
63. See supra section II.A and accompanying footnotes.
64. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
66. Fellows, supra note 16, at 386.
67. See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 289 (1997) (“Unless prompted by
economic necessity, her return to work is generally considered discretionary.”); McCaffery,
supra note 6, at 1019 (“simple survival creates a strong economic incentive to work among
lower income classes”); Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax
Disincentives for Married Women, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921, 939 (2009) (“Other
mothers need to work just to provide the basic necessities for their families.”).
68. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1027-28.
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continue working in part-time positions.69
Furthermore, high achieving, and thus high earning, women in particular
face an additional barrier to workforce participation as mothers. The social
expectation to be a “good mother,” often at the expense of direct workforce
participation, pressures high-earning women more than their lower earning
counterparts precisely because of their elective workforce participation.70
While lower income secondary earners must work to maintain a certain level
of comfort, top-income secondary earners are often criticized for neglecting
their familial obligations for “selfish” income production outside the house.71
In fact, the Tax Code consistently has reflected a bias in favor of necessary
child-care expenses over elective child-care expenses.72
Consequently, high achieving women face workforce participation
disincentives both under the Tax Code and in society as a whole. Although
clearly not the sole or even primary source of female workforce opt-out, the
Tax Code’s joint filing and Dependent Care Credit structures establish
additional barriers to those women seeking top positions by perpetuating a
gendered labor division between monetary and nonmonetary family
contributions.73

69. See McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1025 (“But the tax laws by and large do not support
this reality; they stick to a single-earner model. The results are tax-related incentives not to
have children, not to marry if the spousal incomes are apt to be equal, and to specialize
between market and nonmarket production.”). Note, however, that McCaffery recognizes
that reality does not always reflect those incentives within the Tax Code, “[t]he fact that many
upper-income families have resisted these incentives is testimony to the appeal of different
familial models, as well as to the flexibility that money brings to ignore certain economic
incentives.” Id. at 1025.
70. SCOTT COLTRANE, FAMILY MAN, 25 (1996). “According to the so called traditional
view, it is a man’s duty to serve his family by being a breadwinner and protector, whereas a
woman’s duty is to be a good wife and mother. More than any other cultural belief, this
idealized notion of separate spheres for mothers and fathers shapes what it means to be a man
or woman in our society.” Id. Therefore, to fulfill their role in the traditional model, potential
top-earning mothers are incentivized to stay home and commit to full time parenting rather
than reenter the workforce. See id., McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1027-28.
71. See COLTRANE, supra, note 70, at 25; Slaughter, supra note 1 (describing women who
step back from high pressure careers to devote more time to their family obligations, “Many
factors determine this choice, of course. Men are still socialized to believe that their primary
family obligation is to be the breadwinner; women, to believe that their primary family
obligation is to be the caregiver. But it may be more than that. When I described the choice
between my children and my job to Senator Jeanne Shaheen, she said exactly what I felt:
“There’s really no choice.”); Tyler G. Okimoto & Madeline E. Heilman, The “Bad Parent”
Assumption: How Gender Stereotypes Affect Reactions to Working Mothers, 68 J. SOCIAL
ISSUES 701 (2012) (finding that working mothers are often perceived as less competent parents
only when “working out of choice.”).
72. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1965–70 (discussing Congress’s reasons for the 1971
revisions of former § 214); Smith v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039 (1939) aff’d, 113 F.2d
114 (2d Cir. 1940); Fellows, supra note 16, at 386; Samansky, supra note 16 at 260; see I.R.C.
§ 214 (1954); I.R.C. § 214 (1971).
73. “Encouraging upper income women to stay home deprives women of powerful, and
symbolically important, roles.” McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1028.
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III. THE IDEAL MODEL: EQUAL PARTICIPATION
After identifying the inherent gender bias in the Tax Code as a reflection
of greater gendered labor and caregiving roles in society, one must turn to
how these structures should be altered. By defining the ideal model, we will
be able to identify how to achieve that model and determine the most
efficient and effective steps toward its achievement. While some scholars
argue that gendered labor division is the most effective method of economic
production and family organization,74 this model serves to perpetuate deeply
Moreover, workforce and family
entrenched gender stereotypes.75
participation that breaks these rooted gender stereotypes have been found to
promote desirable outcomes.76 Therefore the most effective family structure
should reduce, if not completely eliminate, these gender stereotypes.77
This ideal structure, which we will define here as the Equal Participation
Model, contemplates equal participation in all spheres of life. It is a model
where, in the aggregate, women and men participate equally in the individual
family unit and in society as a whole.78 In different industries and different
levels in each organization, men and women share equal representation.
The Equal Participation Model contains both micro benefits in the family
unit and macro benefits for society. For the individual family unit,
equalizing monetary and nonmonetary contributions between spouses helps
to promote harmony in the household, social development for fathers, and
positive gender ideals in children.79 Stepping away from the individual unit,
equal male and female participation in the family unit will in turn positively
impact gender participation in larger social structures. More balanced male
and female participation in top positions will positively impact education,
business, and government for all members of society.

74. COLTRANE supra note 70, at 153 (explaining how “human capital theory . . . legitimizes
separate spheres and promotes a gender-segregated division of family and market labor” using
a neutral efficiency analysis); Joel S. Hollingsworth, Save the Cleavers: Taxation of the
Traditional Family, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 29 (2001) (arguing certain modifications under the
Tax Code to minimize penalties for traditional single earner households to promote effective
child-care).
75. See COLTRANE, supra note 70. See generally Fellows, supra note 16, at 373 (describing
the work of notable tax Scholar Henry Simons, “The stereotype of the non-working wife was
powerful enough to let his argument pass as the equivalent of sound analytical tax policy.”).
76. See infra sections III.A, III.B and accompanying footnotes.
77. Id.
78. Note that this model considers participation in the aggregate, for it clearly would be
impossible for every single family to reflect a perfect 50-50 participation split. Even under
this model, certain families would not reflect an equal split. Furthermore, the Equal
Participation Model would result logically in roughly equivalent percentages of men and
women opting out of the workforce to engage in full time child rearing.
79. See infra section III.A.
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A. BETTER FAMILIES THROUGH BALANCED MONETARY AND
NON-MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS
Equal participation in the family unit envisions roughly equivalent80
division between spouses in monetary and nonmonetary labor;81 unlike the
traditional family model that would allocate most, if not all, monetary labor
to the husband, while the wife performed non-monetary labor for the
household.82 The Equal Participation Model, through its equitable labor
allocation, benefits households in three distinct ways: First, this model
establishes equity and harmony in the family unit by dividing income
producing and caregiving functions equally between spouses;83 second, this
model helps develop often overlooked and under-emphasized social skills in
men, further strengthening spousal relationships; and finally, equal
participation among spouses provides positive role models for children.
Women, and mothers in particular, are the most direct beneficiaries of
the equal participation model. Greater equality in labor allocation in the
family unit promotes harmony in the household.84 Roughly equivalent
monetary contribution establishes greater equality in relationships by giving
women more breadwinning power. While women on average devote twice
as much time to nonmonetary labor as their male counterparts,85 the equal
participation model would reduce this time, allowing for more monetary
contribution or personal time. For high earning women in particular, greater
equality within the family unit can help reduce the additional stress that
arises from balancing a demanding career and family obligations.86 This
80. Theoretically such contributions would be divided exactly in half, however realistically
it would be impossible given physical differences and practical considerations. As Scott
Coltrane observed in his 1987-1992 survey among “sharing couples,” labor allocation was
usually made on an ad hoc basis without significant scheduling or forethought. COLTRANE,
supra note 70, at 67. Although Coltrane identified certain inequalities even among sharing
couples (for example, mothers generally performed more laundry duties whereas fathers
tended to focus on external household repairs), “couples were usually happy to live with
unbalanced tasks if they could maintain an image of cooperation and trust underlying their
efforts.” Id. at 65–68.
81. For purposes of this section, monetary labor constitutes that labor for the production of
income, often performed outside the home. Conversely, non-monetary labor is labor
performed within the home for which no direct compensation is earned. While there are
several variations and iterations of monetary and nonmonetary labor, this division is the most
common in modern households.
82. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 25 (“Kind and gentle women are supposed to stay home
to care for children and family, allowing bold and aggressive men to venture out into the
competitive worlds of work, politics and war.”).
83. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
84. Ryznar, supra note 67, at 938 (“One commentator has noted that, in fact, equally
financially dependent spouses are more likely to be equally committed spouses.”).
85. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012, 19 (2012).
86. See Debra L. Nelson and Ronald J. Burke, Women Executives: Health, Stress, and
Success, 14 EXECUTIVE HEALTH 107,112–13 (2000) (identifying the discrepancy between the
total workload experienced by executive men and women, leading to increased overall stress
for female executives and further highlighting the greater risk for anxiety and depression
among executive women resulting from work-family conflict); Slaughter, supra note 1
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stress reduction can improve female executive health and wellbeing by
reducing anxiety and depression triggers than can lead to more serious health
concerns over time.87
In addition to benefitting women through enhanced market participation
and relief from some domestic responsibilities, the Equal Participation
Model serves men and fathers by developing essential social and caregiving
skills.88 In particular, caregiving has been shown to increase fathers’
sensitivity and social development.89 Caregiving participation has also been
shown to improve men’s health90 and effectiveness in their monetary labor.91
Moreover, reduction in out-of-home working hours may also lead to
enhanced workplace performance.92
By enhancing male sensitivity and increasing female empowerment
through employment, the equal participation model can strengthen
marriages.93 Increased male sensitivity through childcare helps improve
communication and commitment in the marriage, and female employment
helps establish equal income producing roles in the marriage.94 Furthermore,
roughly equivalent monetary and non-monetary labor provides similar
(identifying how more balanced scheduling and sharing within the family unit can help those
women seeking to attain top careers while maintaining family obligations).
87. See Nelson & Burke, supra note 86, at 113, 116–17.
88. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 76–80. See also infra notes 89–97 and accompanying
text.
89. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 76–77. “Recognition of increased sensitivity on the part
of the fathers, and their enhanced competence as parents, were typically evaluated with
reference to adopting a vocabulary of motives and feelings similar to the mothers.’” Id. at 77.
90. Julianne Holt-Lunstad, Ph.D., Wendy Birmingham, M.S., Adam M. Howard, B.S., &
Dustin Thoman, Ph.D., Married With Children: The Influence of Parental Status and Gender
on Ambulatory Blood Pressure, 38 ANNALS OF BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 170, 176 (2010). This
study revealed significantly lower blood pressure among parents, though this difference was
more pronounced among women. Id.
91. Jamie J. Ladge, Beth K. Humberd, Marla Baskerville Watckins, & Grad Harrington,
Updating the Organization Man: An Examination of Involved Fathering in the Workplace, 29
THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 152, 165 (2015) (“We find that spending more
time with their children during the workday is related to many important work outcomes for
fathers that can have a positive impact on organizations.”).
92. Gary Siniscalco, Lauri Damrell, & Clara Morain Nabity, The Pay Gap, The Glass
Ceiling, and Pay Bias: Moving Forward Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act, 29 ABA J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 395, 414–17 (“numerous studies show that long hours do not necessarily enhance
the bottom line or equate to success”).
93. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 78–79; Katherine Twamley, Ginny Brunton, Katy
Sutcliffe, Kate Hinds, & James Thomas, Fathers’ Involvement and the Impact on Family
Mental Health: Evidence from Millennium Cohort Study Analyses, 16 COMMUNITY, WORK &
FAMILY 212, 217–18 (2013) (finding a positive correlation between father involvement in
child-caregiving and overall family mental well-being). In fact, research has shown that
couples “who spend more time on household labor report more frequent sex. Even after
controlling for time spent in paid labor, the positive association between hours spent on
housework with sexual frequency remains, and paid work hours are also positively associated
with sexual frequency.” Constance T. Gager and Scott T. Yabiku, Who Has the Time? The
Relationship Between Household Labor Time and Sexual Frequency, 31 JOURNAL OF FAMILY
ISSUES 135, 156 (2010).
94. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 78.
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responsibilities, expectations, and considerations in the family unit.95
Although female workforce participation was once blamed for increasing
divorce rates and family instability, recent scholarship actually has
concluded that such trends have significantly declined, if not ceased
altogether.96
Finally, children can benefit from the equal participation model because
they are able to observe positive gender role models and receive diverse
caregiving from two parents.97 Generally speaking, “[t]he involvement of
men in child care . . . influences the socialization of children into gender roles
and family formation processes, including gendered divisions of labor in the
next generation of families.”98 Studies consistently have found positive
correlations between paternal involvement and child wellbeing.99 For
example, daughters who observe more egalitarian domestic and workforce
participation among parents are more likely to aspire towards careers apart
from traditional gender roles.100
Within the family unit, the Equal Participation Model mirrors the
growing social roles of fathers and mothers sharing duties of both caregiving
and economic production for the household.101 As Jill Yavorksy identifies
in her article The Production of Inequality: The Gender Division of Labor
95. COLTRANE, supra note 70, at 79.
96. Bisakha Sen, Does Married Women’s Market Work Affect Marital Stability Adversely?
An Intercohort Analysis Using NLS Data, 60 REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY Vol. 1, 71, 87
(Mar. 2002) (finding that current trends show greater family stability when both spouses work,
and concluding that the data “impl[ies] that further economic opportunities for women will
not be detrimental to familial stability, and hence should not be discouraged”).
97. See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
98. Scott Coltrane, Gender Theory and Household Labor, 63 SEX ROLES 791, 796 (2010)
(hereinafter Coltrane, Gender Theory). See also Scot M. Allgood, Troy E. Beckert, & Camille
Peterson, The Role of Father Involvement in the Perceived Psychological Well-Being of
Young Adult Daughters: A Retrospective Study, 14 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
PSYCHOLOGY 95, 98 (2012) (“greater father participation in child rearing was associated with
less stereotypical views of gender roles”).
99. Twamley et al., supra note 93, at 216 (citing several studies, “There appears to be a
positive correlation between fathers’ involvement in childcare and children’s wellbeing.”);
Allgood, supra note 98, at 98 (noting studies demonstrating that daughters’ greater selfesteem is positively correlated with father involvement).
100. Alyssa Croft, Toni Schmader, Katharina Block, and Andrew Scott Baron, The Second
Shift Reflected in the Second Generation: Do Parents’ Gender Roles at Home Predict
Children’s Aspirations?, 25 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 1418, 1426 (2014) (“children’s explicit
beliefs about gender differences in domestic labor were predicted by the same beliefs held by
their mothers, as well as by their fathers’ tendency to self-stereotype as more work oriented
than family oriented. But for daughters, in particular, a tendency to self-stereotype as more
family than work oriented in the future was uniquely predicted by their parents’ beliefs and
behaviors. Specifically, girls were more likely to envision themselves as working outside the
home when their fathers reported more gender-egalitarian beliefs about domestic labor, but
also when their mothers reported doing relatively less domestic work and self-stereotyped as
more work oriented. Over and above explicit gender-role beliefs, however, fathers’ actual
division of labor and implicit gender-role associations played a key role in predicting
daughters’ occupational aspirations.”).
101. Jill Yavorksy et al., The Production of Inequality: The Gender Division of Labor
Across the Transition to Parenthood, 77 J. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 662, 663–64 (2015).

PARTICIPATING EQUALLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2018]

12/12/2017 3:16 PM

PARTICIPATING EQUALLY

69

Across the Transition to Parenthood, “Cultural conceptualizations of
fatherhood have progressed from a sole focus on economic responsibilities
to expectations that fathers be directly involved in the care of their children
and form close, emotional ties to their children . . . At the same time,
mothers’ roles have expanded to include economic responsibilities.”102
However, as Yavorsky identifies later in her article, actual household labor
distribution has not completely caught up with these changing social
conceptualizations.103
B. BETTER BUSINESS THROUGH EQUAL FEMALE MANAGEMENT
PARTICIPATION
Stepping back from the benefits of equal labor allocation in the home,
the Equal Participation Model seeks gender balance in the greater social and
economic structures. While equal workforce participation has become a
virtual reality, women are noticeably absent from top management
positions.104 The Equal Participation Model seeks equal female management
at all levels because it would establish additional role models for future high
achieving women and result in more effective decision making through
leadership diversity.105
First, it is important to identify how exposure to women in top leadership
positions helps to initiate and perpetuate growing female workforce
participation and aspiration. Role models help inspire young women to reach
toward high achieving careers.106 This inspiration, in turn, perpetuates a
cycle of higher achievement and further aspiration outside of traditional
102. Yavorksy et al., supra note 101, at 663.
103. Id. at 675 (finding that mother spend approximately 8 more hours working, including
both paid economic production and unpaid household labor, than fathers following the
transition to parenthood).
104. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WOMEN, WORK, AND THE ECONOMY:
MACROECONOMIC GAINS FROM GENDER EQUITY, 4 (2013); supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
105. Kimberly Weisul, Women on boards: Are Quotas really the Answer?, FORTUNE (Dec.
5, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/05/women-on-boards-quotas/; Ruth Sullivan, Can
Gender Quotas Get More Women Into Boardrooms?, BLOOMBERG.COM (July 1, 2015)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-01/can-gender-quotas-get-more-womeninto-boardrooms-; see RHODE, supra note 4, at 3 (“For effective performance in an
increasingly competitive and multicultural environment, workplaces need individuals with
diverse backgrounds, experienced, and styles of leadership.”).
106. Lori Beaman, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova researched how women
village leaders in India affected adolescent female future aspirations. Lori Beaman, Esther
Duflo, Rohini Pande, & Petia Topalova, Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and
Educational Attainment for Girls: A Policy Experiment in India, 335 SCIENCE MAGAZINE 582,
582-83 (Feb. 3, 2012). They found that successive female leaders eliminated the aspiration
gap between boys and girls in terms of educational and career goals, concluding, “It is their
presence as positive role models for the younger generation that seems to underlie observed
changes in aspirations and educational outcomes of adolescent girls.” Id. at 586; Joann Lublin,
How Companies are Different When more Women are in Power, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2016
(quoting Robin Ely) (“The more women who are in positions of power visibly, the better it is
for women lower in the organization.’’).
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gender roles and stereotypes.107 Therefore, steps toward equal participation
would empower female leadership.
In addition to the specific value for women, society as a whole will
benefit from equal female management participation.108 It is generally
accepted that women frequently display a distinct leadership style from that
of their male counterparts.109 Studies have previously found that women
have a tendency to display what has been described as a “transformational”
and “interactive” leadership style, focusing more on consensus and
development as opposed to the traditional male “transactional” approach.110
These styles encouraged participation and consciously strove to develop selfworth among all participants in the enterprise, ultimately strengthening
group identity.111
Alongside improving workplace satisfaction, female management has
also proven effective through enhanced performance of companies with
female CEOs.112 While not all companies led by women display improved
performance, expanding research on this subject reflects a general trend
where female directed Fortune 1000 Companies produced 226% better
equity returns than the S&P 500 during the years 2002-2014.113 Similarly,
female politicians have been cited as more effective than their male
counterparts in the performance of certain functions in the political
process.114
107. Female Leadership at 584 (“By the second cycle of female leadership, the gender gap
in educational outcomes is completely erased (and even reversed), and girls spend less time
on household activities….”).
108. Booz & Company, Empowering the Third Billion: Women and the World of Work in
2012, 21 (2012) (“This is perhaps the most noteworthy conclusion of our research—the
economic advancement of women doesn’t just empower women but also leads to greater
overall prosperity . . . economically empowering women is the key to greater societal gains.”).
109. Cheryl de la Rey, Gender, Women and Leadership, 65 AGENDA: EMPOWERING WOMEN
FOR GENDER EQUITY 4, 5 (2005). Although de la Rey addresses the debate concerning
whether women in fact reflect a distinctive leadership style, she points out that the majority
of scholars agree with the assertion that women leaders do display characteristics that set them
apart from their male colleagues. Id.
110. Judy B. Rosener, Ways Women Lead, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov./Dec. 1990).
111. Id. (“[T]he women encourage participation, share power and information, enhance
other people’s self-worth, and get others excited about their work.”); see RHODE, supra note
4, at 5–6 (discussing use of a transformational leadership style among women leaders).
112. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text; Caroline Fairchild, Women CEOs in
the Fortune 1000: By the numbers, FORTUNE (July 8, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/08/
(noting that “[o]nly 5% of Fortune 1000 companies have female CEOs, but those giants
generate 7% of the Fortune 1000’s total revenue” and “Fortune 1000 companies with female
chiefs outperformed the S&P 500 index over their respective tenures”).
113. Pat Wechsler, Women-led Companies Perform Three Times Better than the S&P 500,
FORTUNE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/03/women-led-companies-performthree-times-better-than-the-sp-500/.
114. See Tony Dokoupil, Why Female Politicians are More Effective, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 22,
2011), http://www.newsweek.com/why-female-politicians-are-more-effective-66889 (stating
that female politicians were noticeably more effective in the introduction and sponsorship of
federal bills than male politicians, and those bills were considered most important among the
bills introduced, ultimately suggesting that women were better politicians than men).
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Thus the Equal Participation Model would benefit not only the female
portion of the population through increased representation and the
establishment of beneficial role models, but also society as a whole through
enhanced performance in several fields through uniquely leadership
techniques.115 Moreover, reduction in out of home working hours may also
lead to enhanced workplace performance for both male and female
employees as a result of more effective working hours.116

IV. ACHIEVING THE IDEAL MODEL
Once the equal participation ideal has been identified, the question
becomes how to achieve this model. While abolishing the glass ceiling will
require significant social and psychological evolution, there are ways to
implicitly propel this evolution through tax policy.117 Achieving equal
participation can be advanced through tax policy in the form of individual
and employer centered policies. Individual policies include individual filing
and enhanced childcare deductions for dual income households at all income
levels.118 At the employer level, it would be beneficial to introduce policies
incentivizing flextime for all employees and female workplace advancement
initiatives.119
A. THE TAX CODE AS A MODE OF SOCIAL CHANGE
Sociologists have studied the relationship between social policy and
gender roles for many decades.120 In his brief article Gender Theory and
Household Labor, Scott Coltrane provides a succinct schematic of the
various underlying conditions and causal connections that impact gender
stratification.121 Coltrane suggests that policy, gender ratios among elites,
and changes in gender resources can influence gender stratification in a
society.122 In short, policy undoubtedly will impact behavior, and tax policy
is no exception.123
115. See supra section III.B and accompanying footnotes; Nelson, supra note 86, at 119
(“interventions aimed at increasing women’s opportunities and career development, providing
flexibility at work, and instituting work-family programs can benefit both women and
organizations”).
116. See Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 414–17 (“numerous studies show that long hours
do not necessarily enhance the bottom line or equate to success”).
117. See infra section IV.B and accompanying footnotes.
118. See infra section IV.B.1 and accompanying footnotes.
119. See infra section IV.B.2 and accompanying footnotes.
120. See Coltrane Gender Theory, supra note 98, at 794–99.
121. Id. at 794–99.
122. Id. at 795.
123. See id. (This phenomenon has been described, “government leaders have . . . levers
they can pull to economically empower their female citizens. . . . Countries that do so are
producing results.”); Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 6 (“[T]here is a clear correlation
between the front end processes and policies regarding women’s economic opportunities
(inputs) and the actual success of women in their national economies (outputs).”); Ryznar,
supra note 67, at 934–35 (observing “the inordinate power of the tax code as a policy tool”);
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While some scholars would argue that the Tax Code should not seek to
achieve certain policy objectives or modify behavior, it remains a fact that
the Tax Code will affect taxpayer decisions.124 Although the social and
psychological effects of tax policy may not be apparent at first blush, the
implicit and subconscious effects of these policies ultimately will impact
behavior.125 Therefore it is not only efficient, but also effective to use the
Tax Code to positively impact gender workforce participation and social
stereotypes.
B. POLICY PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE THE EQUAL PARTICIPATION
MODEL
The Tax Code can effect positive change in gender stratification through
amendments both at the individual and employer level. For the individual
taxpayer, the Tax Code can be friendlier to secondary earners through
mandatory individual filing and an improved child-care deduction scheme.126
The Tax Code can provide further policy improvements to gender
stratifications by providing employer incentives for universal flextime and
female leadership and advancement.127 These policies will improve
secondary earner workforce participation, particularly among women in high
achieving, high earning professions.
1. For Individuals
The two primary disincentives for secondary earner workforce
participation arise out of the joint filing model of marriage taxation and the
Dependent Care Credit.128 By adopting mandatory individual filing, the Tax
Code would reduce, if not eliminate, the current marriage penalty for dual
income households while reducing the marginal rate of secondary earners.129
By reforming the Dependent Care Credit, top secondary earners will benefit
equally by this policy.130
a. Individual Filing
Individual filing for married couples would vastly improve marriage
neutrality in the Tax Code.131 While couples’ equity is another worthwhile
see Slaughter, supra note 1 (“I would hope to see commencement speeches that finger
America’s social and business policies, rather than women’s level of ambition, in explaining
the dearth of women at the top.”).
124. See supra note 123.
125. Coltrane, Gender Theory, supra note 98, at 795 (identifying that policies are one of the
many factors influencing gender stratification).
126. See infra section IV.B.1 and accompanying footnotes.
127. See infra section IV.B.2 and accompanying footnotes.
128. See supra section II and accompanying footnotes.
129. See infra section IV.B.1.a and accompanying footnotes.
130. See infra section IV.B.1.b and accompanying footnotes.
131. Listokin, supra note 30, at 189. Listokin argues that neutrality is desirable under the
Tax Code because “A system of marriage taxation that is marriage neutral does not alter
incentives to marry, enhancing efficiency. Marriage neutrality also ensures that labor/leisure
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principle in tax policy, and is the principle favored under our current joint
filing structure,132 marriage neutrality is more desirable in modern society.133
Indeed, many of the income shifting reasons for Congress’s current joint
filing rate structure are not as prevalent in modern society, and in fact should
be discouraged to achieve the Equal Participation Model.134
Joint filing eliminated the incentives for couples with large income
discrepancies to split income and reduce tax liability. In the Equal
Participation Model, this income discrepancy is, in an ideal scenario,
completely eliminated so that the incomes of both spouses are essentially the
same.135 Therefore the Tax Code should seek to reduce income discrepancy
between spouses, which can be achieved through individual filing because
tax liability of couples would be lowest when each earns roughly equivalent
income.136 By improving marriage neutrality in the Tax Code, there will be
fewer disincentives for secondary earner opt-out, thus increasing secondary
earner, and thus female, workforce participation.137

trade-offs are unaffected by the system of marriage taxation. Marriage neutrality also embeds
the equitable principle that marriage should not change someone’s tax liability.” Id. at 191.
132. Id. at 188 (“From 1948 through the present day, the Code has prioritized progressive
marginal rates and couples equity.”).
133. Id. at 188–91. Listokin argues that marriage neutrality and couples equity are equally
desirable, which, although persuasive, is not the case when looking at policy used to effect
social change in gender roles. Id. at 192. Listokin justifies his marriage taxation model,
“Rather than coping with the trilemma by disfavoring some taxpayers but not others,
taxpayers behind a veil of ignorance should prefer to share the burdens of the trilemma
more equally.” Id. at 194. While couples equity is a worthwhile principle, it does not
provide a strong enough justification in light of the significant joint filing disincentives for
female secondary earners; see supra section II.A and accompanying footnotes. Moreover,
most modern families do not follow the same single income structure that was common
when the joint filing system was first introduced. See also Brigid Schulte, Unlike in the
1950s, there is no ‘typical’ U.S. family today, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014) https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2014/09/04/for-the-first-time-since-the-1950s-thereis-no-typical-u-s-family/.
134. Listokin, supra note 30, at 190–91. Listokin states: “Joint filing eliminates the
incentive to engage in specious transactions or otherwise undesirable legal changes in an
attempt to minimize the total tax liability of a married couple. Joint filing also obviates the
need to allocate income from communal property to one spouse or the other, an unavoidably
byzantine process.” Id. at 190–91.
135. See supra section III.A and accompanying footnotes.
136. In an individual filing system, consider couples AB and CD in which A earns $40,000,
B earns $0, C earns $20,000 and D earns $20,000 before taxes. Using the rates under § 1(c),
C and D will both be taxed at a rate of 15%, resulting in $3,000 tax liability each and a total
after tax income of $34,000 to CD. See I.R.C. § 1(c). Under those same brackets, A will be
assessed taxes of $3,315, plus 28% of A’s income over $22,000 ($5,012), resulting in a total
AB after tax income of $31,673. See id. Recognize that these calculations are rudimentary
and are intended for illustration purposes only.
137. INT’L MONETARY FUND, WOMEN, WORK, AND THE ECONOMY: MACROECONOMIC GAINS
FROM GENDER EQUITY, 13 (2013); INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL POLICY AND EMPLOYMENT
IN ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES, 24–25 (2012) (presenting empirical studies
showing overall greater female workforce participation elasticity and demonstrating that tax
relief for women and secondary earners would stimulate workforce participation).
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While optional filing would be a more politically feasible alteration of
the current filing structure, achieving the Equal Participation Model would
require a more radical approach such as mandatory individual filing.
Optional individual filing such as that proposed in the late 1990s Marriage
Tax Elimination Act138 would present only a marriage bonus, without any
penalty for couples with large income discrepancies.139 To achieve the Equal
Participation Model, policies favoring dual income households over single
income households would need to be adopted. Furthermore, optional
individual filing would be economically undesirable because it would only
reduce married couples’ tax burden without any structural alterations to
make up that lost revenue.140 However politically undesirable, mandatory
individual filing would be a significant step towards increasing secondary
earner workforce participation, leading towards the Equal Participation
Model.
Although moderate reforms in which dual-earning couples with roughly
equivalent incomes receive a lesser marriage penalty than under the current
joint filing scheme are appealing and more politically feasible,141 they would
not be an effective step toward equal participation. Similarly, proponents of
a secondary earner credit would not further the goals of the Equal
Participation Model because they often favor those in lower income brackets
at the expense of top earners.142

138. Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
139. The Marriage Tax Elimination Act provided optional individual filing for married
couples under § 1(c) in addition to joint filing under § 1(a). Marriage Tax Elimination Act,
H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2
(1997). This reform would have only eliminated the marriage penalty for dual income
couples, while single income couples would still be eligible for the joint filing marriage bonus.
See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
140. Cicconi, supra note 29, at 285 (“[A]n optional single filing system would be very
costly, because it would eliminate the marriage penalty while retaining the marriage bonus”).
141. Although a proposal such as Listokin’s reformed § 1(d) married filing separately does
provide significant relief for dual income couples, achieving the Equal Participation Model
requires an elimination of any marriage penalty for dual income couples, if not a marriage
bonus for those households. Listokin, supra note 31, at 199–200. Other scholars have
essentially ruled out joint filing as a politically feasible alternative in the United States and
thus turned to other sources of reform to help alleviate secondary earner bias in the Tax Code.
E.g., Cicconi, supra note 20, at 290 (proposing a secondary earner credit); Office of the Press
Secretary, supra note 62 (proposing dependent care credit expansion).
142. Cicconi presents a “secondary earner work expense credit” available to all secondary
earners for all expenses related to entering the workforce, including childcare. Cicconi, supra
note 29, at 293–94. Cicconi’s proposal phases out starting at incomes above $25,000,
resulting in no available credit for dual income couples earning more than $105,000. Id.
Similarly, the White House Fact Sheet also focuses on expanding dependent care credit
availability to lower and middle income households. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note
62.
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Mandatory individual filing would shift the Tax Code’s preference away
from couples’ equity towards a marriage neutral system.143 This reform
would significantly reduce secondary earner labor disincentives through
lower marginal rates for secondary earner income. The impact would be felt
most by those with higher incomes because they feel the marriage penalty
most severely.144 Overall, reduction of secondary earner workforce
participation disincentives, especially among top earners, would make
significant strides towards the goal of equal participation.
b. Child and Dependent Care Credit Reform
Alongside mandatory individual filing, the Tax Code can further
promote the Equal Participation Model by reforming the current Child and
Dependent Care Credit to benefit top earners in addition to those in lower
and middle brackets. President Obama’s proposal to reform the Dependent
Care Credit, while effective in alleviating burdens on lower and middleincome families through increased access to the credit and amount available
under the credit, does not address the additional disincentives for top-income
secondary earners.145 Even though adopting a childcare deduction would be
the most effective in reducing top earner workforce participation
disincentives, itemized deductions such as childcare expenses tend to benefit
top earners more significantly than their lower income counterparts.146 The
Dependent Care Credit therefore should remain a credit, but the current
phase down for top earners should be eliminated to reduce top-income
secondary earner disincentives to workforce participation.
Reforms to the Dependent Care Credit should incorporate an elimination
of the current phase down and an increase in the credit value available to
reflect current childcare costs. Elimination of the current phase down would
reduce progressivity,147 making this credit available for top earners in the
same amount as their lower earning counterparts.148 The prior White House
143. Listokin, supra note 30, at 189.
144. See supra section II.A and II.C and accompanying footnotes.
145. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 62. One key goal of President Obama’s
proposal is to make the Tax Code more simple and fair for middle income families. Id. One
method to accomplish this goal is to “[s]treamline child care tax incentives to give middleclass families with young children a tax cut of up to $3,000 per child.” Id.
146. In fact, the current system was adopted in 1976 as a reformed version of the dependent
care credit. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text. The change from a deduction to
a credit arose out of critiques of the deduction’s regressive nature. Id.; S. Rep. No. 94-938,
pt. 1, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3565 (describing the credit’s
benefits for lower and middle income households).
147. Fellows, supra note 16, at 386 (“By circumventing the progressive rate structure to
allow for greater reductions in tax liability for lower-income taxpayers than for higher-income
taxpayers, the credit appears more related to redistribution of wealth concerns than
determining the appropriate tax base under an ideal accretion tax.”).
148. Fellows, supra note 16, at 386. (“Another reason for favoring a deduction that is not
limited either by the income level of the taxpayer or the amount spent for employmentrelated childcare concerns the tax inequity created by the exclusion of childcare services,
performed in the home by parents, from the tax base, and the class, gender, and race
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proposal to increase Dependent Care Credit available for lower and middle
income households would alleviate some of these pressures, the continuation
of the phase-down at incomes exceeding $120,000 would still preclude a
significant portion of top-income couples from taking advantage of the
credit.149 However, the additional pressures on high income secondary
earners requires credit availability for those families to provide incentives to
continue workforce participation. This proposal reflects fairness because
childcare expenses are no less expensive for top earners.150
In addition to the elimination of the Credit’s phase down, there are
several other changes that could be introduced to more accurately reflect
expenses while simultaneously providing necessary limitations on the
available credit. First, the applicable percentage of the demonstrable
expenses credited should be increased to more accurately mirror the costs of
secondary earner workforce participation.151
However, to maintain
reasonable restrictions on the Dependent Care Credit, the current cap on
allowable credit amount would remain to avoid a bias in favor of top earners
who chose to spend more on childcare.152 This cap should be increased to
more accurately reflect the current costs of childcare, and should be reevaluated regularly to assure adequacy.153
This reformed Child and Dependent Care Credit would only be available
to the lesser income spouse. By allocating the credit to this earner in the
household, this policy would provide further incentives for equal workforce
participation. Single parent households would be eligible for the reformed
credit because they will incur the same childcare expenses as dual income
couples. Childless dual income couples would be eligible for a reduced
credit under this same section, a credit roughly attributable to the costs

implications of that exclusion.”).
149. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 62.
150. While it may be argued that top earners have more disposable income to spend on
childcare, progressive marginal rates and increased labor hours for elite careers would reduce
the available childcare funds while at the same time increasing childcare expenses.
Eliminating the Dependent Care Credit phase down would reduce the effects of other
progressive elements of the Tax Code for secondary earners (primarily women) in topearning, elite professions. As explained above, it is desirable to increase female participation
in these elite professions, as they remain the primary area of female underrepresentation.
151. Under current § 21, taxpayers can claim a credit of up to 35% of the cost of
employment-related expenses. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2007).
152. I.R.C. § 21(c) (2007).
153. The average annual cost of infant care ranges from approximately $4,000 to $17,000
across the states. CHILD CARE AWARE OF AMERICA, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF
CHILDCARE: 2015 Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, 30 (2015). Unfortunately President Obama’s proposal would not
sufficiently increase the available credit in a majority of states. See Office of the Press
Secretary, supra note 62 (this proposal would increase the available credit to $3,000). A more
adequate credit increase would raise the available credit to be closer to the national average,
and ideally vary by state based upon the state’s average childcare cost for children of a given
age. See CHILD CARE AWARE OF AMERICA, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILDCARE: 2015
Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, 30 (2015).
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associated with workforce participation.154 However, single income, dual
parent households would not be eligible for the reformed credit, to further
reflect actual childcare expenses and further incentivize dual income
households. Reforming the Child and Dependent Care Credit by eliminating
the phase down, increasing the allowable percentage credit allowed, and
shifting this credit to the lower income spouse in the individual filing model
would further the goals of the Equal Participation Model.
2. Employer Incentives
In addition to incentives aimed directly toward taxpayers through
individual filing and enhanced secondary earner dependent care credits, the
Equal Participation Model would be furthered by employer related policies
including: flextime and childcare assistance incentives for all employees and
female leadership incentives.
The first prong of employer directed policies includes incentivizing
flextime employment for all employees. While flextime employment has
been primarily directed towards female labor, encouraging flextime for all
employees would reflect current trends in family/work mindsets.155
Increased flextime for women would improve female workforce
participation,156 and flextime options for men could also improve their
More specifically,
workplace contributions and job satisfaction.157
improved, no fault flextime options for women could improve their ability
to attain top careers, because their advancement would not be as hindered by
family obligations.158 Increasing flextime would not only encourage equal
family participation in households, but also may potentially improve
workforce productivity.159
154. See Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 62 (this would mirror the $500 secondary
earner credit under President Obama’s proposal).
155. Ladge et al., supra note 91, at 154. Ladge identifies how current workforce
expectations conflict with growing desires among fathers to participate in childcare. Id.
156. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 137; Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 62.
157. Ladge et al., supra note 91, at 165 (“Yet our research suggests that it may actually hurt
organizations to not support involved fathering. We find that spending more time with their
children during the workday is related to many important work outcomes for fathers that can
have a positive impact on organizations . . . Thus, it appears to be in the organization’s best
interest to create conditions that allow fathers to be involved at home and at work.”).
158. Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 62 (“Women in professional and managerial
positions generally have more autonomy and control over their daily work schedules, but the
same principles apply. If companies are to realize the benefit of their talent investments,
formal policies and programs are needed to help women stay in the game and maintain a
career path throughout life’s many phases. These policies may include areas such as
telecommuting, flextime, and “off-ramp” and “on-ramp” career paths that allow highly
qualified women to take time off for family obligations without sidelining their opportunities
for promotion and greater responsibility.”).
159. See Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 414. Increased flextime and reduction in
working hours can result in more sleep for historically high hour workers. It has been
estimated that “lack of sleep drains more than $63 billion from the nation’s economy each
year.” Id. (citing Amanda MacMillian, Insomnia costs U.S. $63 Billion Annually in Lost
Productivity, CNN (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/01/health/insomnia-cost-
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Alongside enhanced flextime programs, employer incentives to provide
some measures of childcare assistance would improve female workforce
participation. This can come in the form of tax incentives for employers
offering childcare services, paid leave for childcare, and childcare cost
subsidies for their employees.160 Perhaps the most necessary form of
employer childcare assistance solutions is an adoption of income support or
paid leave during maternity leave as has been adopted in other OECD
countries.161 Another alternative for those seeking a more universal solution
to childcare problems would be the implementation of a quality national day
care.162 While required paid maternity leave and national day care would
greatly improve workforce participation incentives for mothers, a more
modest and effective proposal would be simply incentivizing private,
employer-funded alternatives.163
The second prong of employer-focused reforms would be incentives to
increase female management. While some countries have required female
quotas in management,164 history has proven the general American distaste
for affirmative action programs. These incentives can be in the form of tax
credits to organizations that demonstrate increased female management
participation, and to a lesser degree those organizations demonstrating
conscious efforts to enable female advancement. By rewarding both
employer accomplishment and efforts in female advancement and
leadership, more organizations will be able and willing to adopt female
friendly policies. Examples of employer policies eligible for these tax
incentives include: programs to help women who have stepped out of the
workforce,165 results only work environments,166 and programs designed to
enhance female management development.167 Adopting these programs will
help improve the percentage of women in top management positions, thus

productivity/). Flextime could also improve performance by reducing the instance of burnout.
Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 415.
160. Booz & Company, supra note 108, at 62; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 137.
161. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 137.
162. See Heather S. Dixon, National Daycare: A Necessary Precursor to Gender Equality
with Newfound Promise for Success, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 566 (2005).
163. Employer established programs would transform gender relations in individual
organizations instead of imposing broad one size fits all mandates.
164. Norway, Spain, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland are examples of
countries that have implemented gender quotas in business management. See Alison Smale
& Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in Boardrooms, N.Y. TIMES, A1 (Mar. 6,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/europe/german-law-requires-more-wom
en-on-corporate-boards.html?r=0. See also Sullivan, supra note 105.
165. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 1033.
166. Siniscalco et al., supra note 92, at 415 (“Results Only Work Environments’ employees
flexibility to decide when, where, and how they work, as long as they get their work done.
Rigorous studies have demonstrated that ROWE reduces turnover, interruptions at work, and
unproductive time and increases employees’ sense of job involvement.”).
167. Developing female management styles and potential can improve both female
representation and entity performance. See supra section III.B and accompanying footnotes.
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working toward the second goal of the Equal Participation Model.168

V. CONCLUSION
As the preceding pages have shown, there are many ways in which the
Tax Code reflects antiquated gender stereotypes through the current joint
filing and dependent care credit, stereotypes that no longer reflect the modern
family structure.169 Moreover, there is evidence that a more balanced family
structure among spouses and in the workforce can positively impact varying
sectors of society: women are empowered by increased opportunity, men are
able to contribute to the family unit and develop additional social skills,
children are influenced by a more diverse parenting structure, and
management is enhanced through a more diverse team of employees.170
Therefore it is not only rational, but also desirable to strive toward the Equal
Participation Model, where spouses share parental and income producing
roles in the family unit, and where businesses divide all levels of the
workforce evenly between men and women.171 Finally, the Tax Code can be
a positive force for achieving this ideal model by eliminating those outdated
barriers to equal participation by adopting individual filing for married
couples and a more neutral dependent care credit among all income strata.172
By embracing the spirit of these policies, we can continue to move toward a
more egalitarian and productive workforce and society.

168. See Slaughter, supra note 1 (“[Some] scholars have concluded that good family policies
attract better talent, which in turn raises productivity, but that the policies themselves have no
impact on productivity.”).
169. See supra section II and accompanying footnotes.
170. See supra section III and accompanying footnotes.
171. Id.
172. See supra section IV and accompanying footnotes.
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